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JN TiiE SUPREME COURr
OF THE STATE OF

urAH

HEIDIMARIE FOULGER,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
Case No. 16,909

vs.
JOHN C. FOULGER,
I:efendant and
Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEF'END\NT - APPELIANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal is taken frcxn a final order issued by the Fourth
Judicial District Court presided over by the Honorable David Sam and
entered February 4th,1980, which m:x:lified the provisions of Paragraph 5
of a I:ecree of Divorce entered by the Honorable George E. Ballif, in
the

SaJ:IE

Court October 29,1975.
DISPOSITION IN THE ill\TER COURr

A hearing on the plaintiff-respondent's application for rroiification
of the original Divorce D=cree was held D2cernb2r 18,1979.

On February

4th, 1980, the trial Court entered an Order granting the respon:Jent's

application to increase thEi child support provisions of the original r:J=cree
and modify the pro,perty settlerrent provisions.

modifying the property settlenent provisions

It ::..s fran the Order

tha~

t1-:is a:=peal is taken.
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RELIEF SOlQIT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have this Court reverse the Trial Court's
order--arrending the property disIX>sition provision of the Decree of
Divorce d-ted October 29,1975, and to reinstate that Order.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On. October 29, 19·75, a default Divorce D2cree was entered grant-

ing a divorce to the respondent, paragraph 5 of which provided as
follows:
The plaintiff is hereby awarded all right, title and interest
in and to the real pro:p2rty and residenre at 195 North 7th
East, Pleasant Grove, Utah, described as folla.vs, to-wit:
Canrrencing at the Northeast corner of Lot 1, Block 43,
Plat "A", Pleasant Grove City Survey; thence South lll.10
feet; thence West ill. 60 feet; thence North lll.10 feet;
thence East 111. 60 feet to beginning.
subject, ho...;ever, to a lien on said premises in behalf of
the defendant equal to 50% of the arrount received fran any
sales in excess of $17,000.00, which is the purchase prire
of said residence. D2fendant is further awarded a first
option to purchase said residence in the event of sale and
apply his equity upon said purchase price. Plaintiff is
hereby granted the right to reside in said residence as
long as she so desires, but in the event of sale, the above
formula shall apply."
This provision was entered folla.ving the Court's ar:proval of a
Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement which had been executed
by both parties hereto on September 12, 1975, paragraph 4 of which contained the provision cited above.
In the original pleading the respondent was represented by Heber
Grant Ivins, an attorney locate:l in American Fork, Utah.

The Settlement

- 2 -
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Agreenent was prepared by him.

The appellant was not represented in

said proceedings. (Transcript page 25)
Respondent's application to nodify the provisions setforth above

was heard on an Order to ShON Cause refore the Honorable David Sam on
I:ecember 18,1979.

In

that proceeding the respondent contemed that

paragraph 5 should be arrended lJecause she had been residing in the hone
since the divorce decree was entered,

h~d

made all of the rrortgage pay-

rrents, paid all of the taxes and insurance, had installed carpet in two
\

roans, wants to finish the baserrent and took the position that it is not
fair to allow the apepellant to continue to share in the hare's appreciated
value beyond the date of the original divorce decree. (Order to Show Cause
and Affidavit in re Modification of Divorce dated Noverrber 19,1979)

The appellant contends that the circumstances surrounding the original
stipulation and settlerrent Agreerrent and its subsequent approval by the
trial couit have not changed, except for sbrre anticipated irrproverrents to
re made to the hare by the respondent, and that the payrrent of taxes, insur".""
ance and mortgage installm:mts by the respondent were all anticipated at t:11e
tine she was awarded the hare.

·He is not interested in sharing any increases

in the value of the hare which may result fran the installation of new permanent .irrproverrents, but desired when the n=cree was entered into and continues
to desire to share in any increase in value resulting from the efforts of

reither party but rrerely frorn changes in the over....,all suate of the econany.

- 3 -
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The Appellant testified that he had a specifi~ purpose in setting
no tine limit on the sale of the hone, but in having his interest in the
hare remain at 1/2 of the sale value in order to induce the Respondent
to remain in the horre ?Ild to not sell it without the penalty of having to
pq.y 50% of the proceeds to him, because he wanted his children to remain

in the area and was apprehensive that the Respondent may return to Gennany
where she had lived prior to caning to the United States. ( See transcript
page 61)

The Respondent denies that this was the rrotive for that type

of disposition on the hare and essentially testified that she was not totally
aware of the negotiations between her counsel and the Appellant and

~as

under a great deal of stress at the tille (Page 66 Transcript •

.ARGUMENI' ON APPEAL

POINT I
THE TRIAL CDURT'S ORDER GRANTING.RESPONDENT'S PEI'ITICN 'IO AMEND
THE PROPERTY SETILEMENT PROVISIONS OF. THE ORIGINAL~DE6IBE OF DIVORCE IS
Nor SUPPORTED·BY ANY MA..'IERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES.
.

.•

No appeal having been taken from t~e Judgrrent entered on Octcber 29,1975,
it beCaITE absolute and final and could not properly be changed or m:xlified
except for a change in circumstances, to the end that the same matters will
not be litigated anew and one trial Judge will not be passing judgrrent upon
the acts of another. (See 1\lein v. l'le in, 54 4, P. 2d 47 2 )
In her application for Order to Shoo cause the Respondent requested

- 4 -
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the Court

to rocx:lify the original Divorce

~cree

in ~ ways.

First,

she wished the Court to increase the child support provisisions and the
Court did.

With this we do not quarrel arrl it is not challenged in tl1is

appeal.
The trial Court' s determination to rrodify the

pr~rty

disp >Si tioo

provisions of Paragraph 5 to cut off the Appellant's equity interest in
the the hate effective Octorer 29,1975, supported by its Findings of
Fact No. 9, in which it finds the original provisions to be "inherently
unfair" insofar as it penni ts the Appellant to share in any on-going
appreciation in value while requiring the Respondent to nake all the
paym:mts on the property, including taxes and insurance.

It also arrived

at that conclusion based on Findings Nos. 10, 11, 12 and 13 that circumstances have changed in that the Respondent has not yet returned to
Germany and was likely not to, had made all of the house payments, tax
payiTents and insurance payrrents on the residence without assistance

fran the Appellant.
It is respectfully submitted that these are not changes of circumstances compelling the alteration made to the original D:?cree.
circurnstancial changes at all.

Those

ar~

not

Obviously, that was contemplated to be the

future case at the tirre the original Decree was entered.

'Ihe respondent

just doesn't like it nCM.
'Ihe respondent contended and the Court found that to allCM the
Appellant to share in any increase in value to the prqJerty because of
:i.mproverrents made by the Respondent subsequent to the Divorce D:?cree is

- 5 -
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absolutely true.

The Appellant has no interest in that typ= of profit,

but it doesn't corrpel or justify depriving him of all increases in value
if those increases are caused by neither of the parties to this action.
POINT II

THE REAL PROPERTY DISPOSITION PROVISIONS OF THE ORIGINAL DECREE
OF DIVORCE WERE NOI' PATENTLY UNFAIR 'IO THE RESPONDENT, WERE APPROVED
BY THE ORIGINAL TRIAL COURT PURSUANT 'IO AN ARM.S-LENGTI:I STIPUIATICN AND
SETrLEMENT AGREEMENT AND CANNCYI' BE AMENDED UNLESS FRAUD, DURESS OR
UNDUE INFLUENCE IS SHOWN AND NO St.al SHCWTIG WAS MADE.

It is respectfully submitted that a Divorce

~cree

providing for

the equal division of the equity from the sale of the hare, after deducting those amounts paid by the Respondent on the original mortgage while
allowing the Resp:mdent to live there in return for making the payrrents
on the mortgage, the taxes, the insurance and the rna.intenance is not
patently unfair.

This is particularly true where the home is the

principal asset acquired by the parties during their marriage.
Even if a preponderance of the evidence support the finding that it
is unfair, the Respondent is still not entitled to set it aside sirrply
because she made a bad bargain.
It has been repeatedly held that no Stipulation and Settlement
Agreement between the parties to a Divorce proceeding is necessarily binding upon the Court and is rrerely advisory in nature.

Once it is approved by

the trial Court, and incorporated in and made a part of the ~cree of Divorce
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beCOlEs a final judgnent of the Court and should not be

disturb..~

m trely

because one or the other of the parties subsequently changes their mi.rrl.
Particularly should this be true where the agree:rrent was pnpared by ca.msel

for the Respondent and contained terms negotiated in an arms-length transaction. (See Saudi.v. Saudi
I.eonard

66 Colo.

360 P2nd 998, 83 Idaho 233

and Hughes vs.

500 181 P. 200).

The provisions of 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated provides among other things,
that " •.•.•••.••• the Court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make such
subsequence changes or new orders with respect to the support and rraintenance
of the parties, the custody of the children and their support and maintenance,
or the distribution of the property as shall be reasonable and recessary ..... "
It is respectfully submitted that this provision should not be construed to
grant to the trial Court the power to give or take away property between the
parties to a divorce action indefinitely unless it makes a specific

reservatio~

of jurisdiction to do so in the original Decree.
CONCLUSIONS
The record in this proceeding does not support any findings by the
trial Court that circumstances have changed since the entry of the original
D=cree of Divorce which would justify the arrendrrent made to that Iecree insofar
as the property settlerrent provisions are concerned.

If the Court were to

enter an arrendenent to the Decree excluding the Appellant fran participating

in any increases in value resulting fran inproverrentrs made by the Respondent
the Appellant has no objection.

That is only fair.

M:>re inp:lrtantly, hc:wever, it is respectfully suhnitted that this Court
should look at adopting a rule in such cases which would rrake the property
divisions of a Settlerrent Agreerrent pennanent, final and unreviewable except
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,
administered
by the Utah State Library.
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through normal appeal channels once they are approved by the Court, inex>rporated into the provisions of the Final U=cree of Divorce and made
the Judgrrent of the Court, unless fraud, duress or.undue influence is
involved, or unless the Court chooses to retain jurisdiction to review the
matter at a subsequent time.

Any other interpretation of the provisions

of 30-3-5 of the Utah Code Armotated may result in gross injustice and
places litigants in a position where they can never cxmnt on pennanently
a.ming anything they have acquired.

Sirrply because a person is subjected

to the juriscli~tion of ,the Co'urt because he becorres. divor~d shouldn 1 t JIEan tl
his property is ·forever sUbject to the power of the Court to take it CJYJa.y
from him.

At sane point in time he should be in a position where he can

count on keeping what has been awarded to him.

What better point to draw

the line than when the U=cree becc:xres absolute and the normal appeal V1IE
has expired.
Obviously such a rule cannot be the case where alimony and child
support provisions are concerned.

But .even with these provisions there is

a point at which they tenninate.·

If the decision of the low=r Court in this

case that a property settlerrent can be reviewed anytfune and. can be changed
if found to be unfair after previously having

reen

approved, then

at which the Court's jurisdiction canes to an end is never reached.

the point
Such a

rule would appear to be intolerable and does not seem to be the position
taken by the rna.jori ty of the Courts who have considered the issue. (See
Kinze v. ~ze, 231 cal. App. 2d 219, 41 cal Rptr 802

- Irwin v. Irwin, 150

Colo. 261, 372 P. 2nd 440 and Ross v. Ross 403 P. 2nd 19 (Oregon).
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It

is respectfully su1:rni tted that the jtrlgrrent of the

arrending the provisions of paragraph 5 of the

~cree

l<:7M~

Court

of Divoroo entered

October 29,1975, should be reversed.

DATED this ~day of .May,1980.

8 North Center Street
.American Fork, Utah 84003

Attorney for r.eferrlant-Appellant

Mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief to Craig Snyder, 120 East
300 North, Provo, Utah 84601, attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent, this

IJTt. day of May,1980.
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